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The concept ‘governing through the community’ has been used frequently to interpret the neoliberal
policy embraced by Australian governments since the 1990s. Yet explanation is still inadequate of how
‘governing through the community’ is conducted in practice, particularly the speciﬁc mechanisms that
regulate interaction among government agencies, groups seeking to represent the community and in-
dividuals in the community. In this study, we ﬁnd that ‘governing through the community’ is actually
‘governing through representatives of the community’ because it is the representatives that make the
community visible and governable. This observation is based on a case study of three kinds of farmer
organizations, in two states of Australia, who see their role as serving the community and are regarded by
outsiders as representatives of the community at least on certain issues. An understanding of the inter-
action among different stakeholders within and outside of the community is developed through three
themes of ‘paperwork’, ‘data’ and ‘price’ that were used by locals from Landcare groups, grower groups and
farmer cooperatives, respectively, to articulate how they experience the mechanisms through which their
interactions are regulated. This paper concludes that these groups can claim to represent some residents
within a deﬁned geographical area, rather than any exact deﬁnition of ‘the community’ and that this is a
sufﬁcient claim to enable these groups to participate in the process of ‘governing through the community’.
The tensions between government agencies, community representatives and community members
threaten the legitimacy of the community representatives as intermediaries. Government agencies do try
to contribute to reduce these tensions by strengthening the legitimacy of community representatives
through various policy and project mechanisms. However, while the stated aim of ‘governing through the
community’ is often focused on producing a ‘ﬂourishing rural community’ through improving democratic
modes of representation, this study demonstrates that it is only part of the community, namely the
‘targeted customers’ of the farmer organizations, that is potentially reachable to ‘the state’.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: farmer organizations as representatives of
the ‘community’
In recent decades, rural Australia has experienced a neoliberalelopment Studies, School of
ty, China.
ng).governance regime, which, amongst other strategies, seeks to deal
with economic and social issues in rural areas by devolving re-
sponsibilities for service provision and rural development, formerly
provided by governments, to local communities, and, through pri-
vate and non-government actors (O'Toole and Burdess, 2004;
Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005; Lockwood and Davidson, 2010).
This strategy has led to both a pluralization of agricultural and rural
development related-funding; a rapidly changing institutional
landscape; and a dramatic reduction of public funding for
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background, different kinds of farmer organizations, who claim to
act on behalf of farming communities, embody the idea of ‘com-
munity’ in this context in different ways and play a key role in the
implementation of neoliberal policy. Since the late 1990s social
researchers (e.g. Lockie, 1999; Herbert-Cheshire, 2000) have
focused on interpreting this regime from a Foucauldian perspective,
using the concept of ‘governing through the community’, also
referred to as ‘governing at a distance’, and ‘advanced governance’
(Rose 1996a, 1996b).
Scholars have described the consequences of this form of
governance on some types of local farmer groups, and rural com-
munity development settings more broadly. In this study we
observe how three types of local farmer organizations formed by
grain producers, namely, Landcare groups, grower groups and
farmer cooperatives, are enrolled by, and utilize different mecha-
nisms of neoliberal governance to ‘represent’ their communities
andmaintain legitimacy with funders and stakeholders. In doing so
we build and expand on the existing empirical base by considering
the effect on both previously studied and other types of local rural
collectives. The ﬁrst of these three groups, Landcare groups,
emerged as part of the Landcare movement, ﬁrst started in Victoria
and then expanded to a national program by the Australian Gov-
ernment in 1989, principally to address environmental problems,
and following the principle of ecologically sustainable develop-
ment (Toyne, 2000). Many Landcare groups targeting speciﬁc local
environmental issues were initiated at that time echoing the
ﬁnancial support from government. The second type, grower
groups, emerged in the early 1990s from farmers seeking produc-
tivity improvements by conducting trials on their own farms. These
groups were quickly supported by the state government agricul-
tural agencies and Research and Development Corporation of
Newfoundland and Labrador through project-based funding, in
turn increasing the number of grower groups. Third, we farmer
cooperatives in Australia were ﬁrst formed in the late nineteenth
century by dairy farmers in New South Wales (Lewis, 2006). In our
study we focus on the bulk handling cooperatives initiated by grain
growers to reduce the cost and improve the service of grain storage
and marketing.
We begin the paper with a brief review of studies of neoliberal
policy in advanced liberal democracies from a governmentality
perspective, focusing particularly on rural Australia. Next, we
overview the three types of farmer groups that serve as case
studies for our analysis and describe our methods. In the analysis
of in-depth qualitative interviews with members and stake-
holders of the organizations, we then identify (i) how different
deﬁnitions of ‘community’ are deployed in the operations of these
groups; and (ii) the diverse mechanisms or technologies of
governance used by the state, and the groups themselves, to
‘govern through the community’. We focus on how these mech-
anisms shape groups understanding of their local community,
their relationships with their own members, and with their fun-
ders and stakeholders. We also examine how the mechanisms
related speciﬁcally to accessing and maintenance of income or
funding for the groups' activities shape these relations. To help
make sense of our ﬁndings we draw on concepts of different
governing ‘mentalities’ and techniques of governance, used by
Lockwood and Davidson (2010) and described below, to explore
and explain differences in the representational and funding dy-
namics within and between the groups in our study. Finally, we
conclude by arguing that farmer organizations, who reinterpret
both the demand of their communities and the supply of policy,
make the neoliberal regime ‘governing through the community’
both possible, and at the same time problematic for local forms of
rural community representation.2. ‘Governing through the community’: top-down, bottom-up
or hybrid governance?
Derived from Foucault's work on governmentality, the concept
‘governing through community’ refers to:
”a way of demarcating a sector for government, a sector whose
vectors and forces could be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in
novel programmes and techniques which operated through the
instrumentalization of personal allegiances and active re-
sponsibilities” (Rose, 1996b, p. 332).
Based on Rose's work, the term ‘governing through the com-
munity’ has been used broadly to analyse the neoliberalist mode of
regulation relied upon in some ‘advanced’ Western countries
(Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins, 2004) in different ﬁelds. These
ﬁelds include the study of school systems and migrant women
programmes in Germany (Schreiber et al., 2015; Marquardt, 2014),
research on urban governance policy in Canada (Rosol, 2014) and
discussion of urban citizenship and rural governance policy in the
UK (Flint, 2002; Ward and McNicholas, 1998; Shucksmith, 2010).
These studies from the UK and Europe show similarities in the
policy directions and programs of rural development to those
experienced in Australia in recent decades (Herbert-Cheshire,
2000). In Australia, this concept has been relied upon to study
the implementation of national agri-environmental programmes
established since the late 1990s. Lockie (1999) shows that in the
neoliberalist context, state agencies actually developed amethod of
governance to mobilise farm businesses to participate in commu-
nity Landcare groups under the Landcare Program, rather than
‘abandon family farmers as transnational agribusiness comes to
dominate the organization of production’. Although widely used in
Australian economic development policy, this regime of ‘governing
through community’ has encountered problems in dealing effec-
tively with the negative effects of globalization. For example
Cheshire and Lawrence (2005) point out that this kind of neoliberal
policy cannot prevent the marginalization of rural and regional
Australia as it does nothing to challenge the mechanisms of
contemporary globalized capitalism.
The concept of ‘hybrid governance’ developed from the term
‘governing through the community’. This terminology helps to
illustrate the complexity of the implementation of neoliberal pol-
icy, although deﬁned differently to some extent by different
scholars. In their discussion with the Foucauldian governmentality
school about the ‘death of the social’, Watt 's (1999) study in south-
east England points out that the neoliberal governance regime is
employed by state agencies together with the universalist princi-
ples of service provision. This mixed assemblage of governance
logics is termed ‘hybrid governance’ (Lockwood and Davidson,
2010) and is used by some Australian scholars to analyse the
mentalities directing the community-based programmes, or in
other words, ‘governing through the community’ practices in
Australia. Higgins and Lockie (2002) argue that hybrid governance
is evident in Australian natural resourcemanagement programmes.
Their research shows that, within this hybrid governance, ‘statistics
of performance’ are employed as technologies, which shape both
the farmers' view on their practices and the policy decisions.
Although embraced as a powerful tool by state agencies, hybrid
governance actually contributes to the failure of agri-
environmental programmes due to its inner conﬂicts between
economic rationalities and social targets (Lockie and Higgins,
2007). Lockwood and Davidson (2010) in their detailed study of
Australian natural resource management policy analyse the men-
talities of hybrid governance. They hold that, within that particular
policy context, neoliberalism, localism and ecocentrism are the
1 The direct funding source for grower groups is Grains Research and Develop-
ment Corporation (GRDC) and other rural industry funding agencies. For the
Research and Development Corporation (RDC) model in Australia, the Australian
Government matches industry expenditure dollar to dollar, with industry funds
derived from a compulsory levy on grain growers. RDCs are generally regarded as
Federal Government agencies by interviewees.
2 The Landcare group we visited in Western Australia is actually the same group
as the grower group investigated there. However, this grower group was initiated as
a Landcare group and maintains a branch to work especially on Landcare projects.
Participants from these two branches were interviewed separately.
3 ‘General farmer members’ refers to farmers who are members of the organi-
zation, yet do not work in it as staff or serve as board members.
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ment. For them, hybrid governance is ‘an assemblage of subjects,
ethics, ends and techniques’ that is directed by these different
mentalities of governance.
While providing a powerful explanation of neoliberal policy in
advanced countries, the governmentality approach has been
questioned by some researchers (e.g. Barnett, 2005; Lockwood and
Davidson, 2010) for its predominant focus on top-down forms of
state power and its regulation of conduct in everyday life. However,
other studies, which devote their attention to the failure of
centralized governance, have emerged in recent years. These
studies expand the former research on governmentality by
analyzing grassroots engagement with and reactions to govern-
ment intervention. For example, Shortall (2008), in his discussion of
the differences between social inclusion, civic engagement,
participation and social capital, demonstrates that some groups fail
to participate in certain rural development programmes. This
analysis indicates that those groups are not necessarily socially
inclusive, rather prospective members automatically chose non-
participation for ‘ideological and theological reasons’. Similarly,
Dinnie et al. (2015) explainwhy some government policies have not
been successfully implemented in Scotland by analysing the
‘counter-discourses’ held by land managers that holds that they are
the only owners of the exclusive knowledge needed to manage
land. Eversole (2011) argues that it is difﬁcult to strengthen com-
munity engagement in government programmes because govern-
ments and communities have different institutional forms and
organizing principles. Other authors analyse the complexity of
communities via a variety of research topics to demonstrate ob-
stacles to involving communities and their members in govern-
ment programmes (Harrington et al., 2008; Scott and Hogg, 2015;
Prager et al., 2015).
The literature outlined above demonstrates the different
analytical perspectives taken in governmentality research in rural
contexts, namely top-down perspectives of state intervention;
bottom-up perspectives of local response to those interventions;
and the complex character of competing mentalities and tech-
niques that contribute to hybridity in the practice in governing
through the community. In this study we engage with these
different dynamics through the lens of local community repre-
sentation in different rural collectives. We examine how repre-
sentation is performed to mediate between state-based objectives;
themaintenance of group funding and legitimacy; and the interests
of place-based rural communities. We seek to extend the empirical
understanding of the diversity of contexts and mechanisms that
shape these multi-level and multi-party relationships within
contemporary rural governance. By focusing on three types of
groups within the grain production industry, the study also high-
lights the diverse, and pervasive ways in which neoliberalism
shapes representational dynamics even with a single agricultural
commodity sector. In doing so we attempt to communicate a more
comprehensive account of how ‘governing through the community’
is attempted and what tensions are inherent in those attempts.
3. Case studies and research methods
Informal scoping discussions with agricultural researchers and
government agency representatives were undertaken at the outset
of the study to identify a range of diverse grain producer-based
groups across two states of southern Australian, namely Victoria
and Western Australia to approach for participation in the study.
Regions within these states are key grain production regions and
provide grain to both domestic and export markets. Initial, ori-
enting ﬁeld visits were made to the Victorian groups in early
November, 2014. Three types of farmer organizations formed bygrain growers, agreed to participate in the study. All of these farmer
organizations (i.e. Landcare groups, grower groups and farmer co-
operatives) see their aim as serving the ‘community’ but deal with
different kinds of issues in rural communities. Landcare groups
mainly focus on environmental issues, grower groups primarily
deal with grain productivity, while farmer cooperatives deal with
the business of grain storage and marketing. Support from gov-
ernment agencies, both directly and indirectly, also forms different
proportions of the groups' income sources. For Landcare groups,
nearly all of their income is derived from national and state gov-
ernments. This funding originally came from national funding
programs (NLP) directly to these local groups. However, since
program was redesigned in the early 2000s, much of these funds
are now mediated through regional or catchment level-natural
resource management organizations. In grower groups, over half
of their income is derived from project grants from the Federal and
state governments.1 Although there is some government support
for farmer cooperatives, such as certain kinds of project grants and
tax deductions, this support is viewed as a very small proportion of
income by interviewees. Crucially, the different proportion of
government money in their income source indicates a different
relationship or distance between the ‘state’ and the ‘community’.
Each type of farmer organization was investigated in both
states: that is six groups within two states.2 In this paper, they are
named Landcare in Victoria (LV), Landcare in Western Australia
(LW), Grower Group in Victoria (GV), Gower Group in Western
Australia (GW), Farmer Cooperative in Victoria (CV) and Farmer
Cooperative in Western Australia (CW) respectively to preserve the
conﬁdentiality of interviewees. Board members, staff members and
general farmer members3 were interviewed in each group. We also
interviewed government agency aligned stakeholders who interact
with but are not members of farmer organizations, including staff
in the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC),
Catchment Management Authority (CMA), Northern Agricultural
Catchment Council (NACC), Grower Group Alliance (GGA), Council
of Grain Grower Organizations (COGGO) and Australian Landcare
International (ALI).
In total, 41 participants were interviewed (see Table 1). All of the
interviews were conducted and audio recorded with the consent of
participants.
The main ﬁeld component of the investigation was conducted
through semi structured qualitative interviews, each of which took
around 40 min to an hour. These interviews were conducted in the
ﬁeld between late 2014 and early 2015. In addition to the in-
terviews participant observation was undertaken at several group
events, staff meetings and project meetings that were held by or
associated with these farmer organizations. Observations and re-
ﬂections were recorded in writing during and after these events
and assisted with contextualizing and interpreting the interview
data.
Interviews were conducted with ofﬁcials or individuals with
leadership roles in each of the groups, and, with regular group
Table 1
Participants from three types of farmer organizations.
Type State Organization No. and Role
of Interviewees
Landcare group Victoria ALI 1 Secretary
CMA 1 Facilitator
LV 1 Facilitator
1 Board member
Western Australia NACC 3 Facilitator
LW 1 Facilitator
1 Board member
3 Farmer member
Grower group Victoria GV 1 Former Chair
1 Acting Chair
1 CEO
1 Communication staff
1 Financial staff
3 Farmer member
Western Australia GGA 1 Chair
1 Staff
GRDC 1 Board member
COGGO 1 Board member
GW 1 Former Chair
1 Current Chair
1 Board member
1 CEO
3 Farmer member
Farmer cooperative Victoria CV 1 Board member
1 Manager
3 Farmer member
Western Australia CW 1 Chair
1 Staff
3 Farmer member
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jority of interviews were conducted with ofﬁcials and leaders in the
groups as these individuals were better positioned to understand
how internal group operation articulated with external stake-
holders and funders. Individuals in these leadership roles are cen-
tral to inﬂuencing group strategy and operational norms and are
more likely to be aware of the funding related relationships that
maintain the group.
Drawing on elements of Davidson and Lockwood's schema for
understanding governmentality in hybrid policy contexts,
described above, Table 2 below presents the generalized interview
topics.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed to ensure accuracy
of interpretation. Transcriptions of interviews were ﬁrstly coded
according to respondent types in different farmer organizations.
This initial coding strategy highlighted the character of represen-
tational and funding relationships between organizations. How-
ever, in the course of analysis three organizing themes became
evident that related to how farmer group members articulated
their experience of the techniques and mechanisms that served toTable 2
Examples of interview topics and relationship with key concepts.
Key concepts Topics with farmer group interviewees
Subjects Primary and other income sources;
Geographic area the group was oriented to and from which the group
were drawn; Relationship with funding bodies; Understanding of me
Ends Reasons for joining group or initiated the group; Goals of the group a
obstacles to achieving those goals;
Ethics Rights and responsibilities within the organization to internal and ex
Risks entailed in relying on certain income sources;
Techniques Changes in income sources over time and the reasons for change; Ma
for interacting with members and demonstrating value and legitimacstructure and legitimate those funding and representational re-
lationships both internally, and externally. These mechanisms also,
clearly, took both material and discursive forms and were referred
to variously as ‘paperwork’, ‘data’ and ‘price’ by group leaders and
members alike.
The following section reports on the results of the analysis,
focusing on how groups deﬁne and seek to serve the interests of
their communities, and how these three mechanisms above regu-
late both their relationship with those communities and their
external funders and stakeholders. It also describes how these
mechanisms serve as technologies of governance, and the tensions
and opportunities created through their application.
4. Results
Table 3 below summarizes the farmer organizations' various
claims to represent grain farmers within a deﬁned geographical
area: that is, the basis on which they constitute their ‘community’.
4.1. Deﬁnitions of ‘community’ according to farmer organization
types
‘Community’ or ‘local’ was the key word emphasized by all
participants, especially board members and staff, in all three kinds
of farmer organizations. This key word was frequently used to un-
derline the value and aim of farmer organizations. Board members
from LV and LW believed that Landcare groups helped to deal with
environmental issues in the rural community and thus enhanced
the proﬁtability of local farmers. Participants from GV and GW hold
that grower groups provided reliable data for local farmers as they
conducted ﬁeld trials within the local community. CV and CWwere
regarded as important organizations to reduce storage costs for
local farmers as farmer cooperatives were controlled by and thus
run for the interest of local farmers. Interviewees in all three types
of farmer organizations thought that their groups brought consid-
erable social beneﬁts to the community, such as job creation and
enhancing communication among local farmers. These social
beneﬁts were seen as crucial for the survival of farming commu-
nities. The following quotation from one manager of CV is a
representative summary of these perceived social beneﬁts:
‘Our organization has a lot of beneﬁts to this community. It's a
farmer community. We buy locally, spend locally. Only if we
can't get it, we can't buy it local. But we try to get it local. We
employ local. We are owned local. And we do support local
sporting clubs and schools.’
Yet, when asked about the exact meaning of ‘community’ and
‘local’, they gave answers that differed according to the type of
farmer organization. For LV and LW, community referred to the localTopics with interviewees from agencies funding
the farmer organizations
members
mbers' interests.
Income source of the funding organization;
Key farmer groups and localities where they invest;
nd The priorities of their program reasons that they started
cooperating with the farmer organizations.
ternal entities; The process of setting priorities and ensuring accountability;
in mechanisms
y
Criteria used to select and evaluate funding objects;
Main mechanisms for implementing strategy and
engaging with farmer groups.
Table 3
Simpliﬁed overview of farmer group community, representational focus and primary regulating mechanism.
Group Type Community deﬁnition (subjects) Representation issues (ends) Regulating mechanism (techniques)
Landcare group Local shire residents Agri-environment Paperwork
Grower group Geographic coverage of agronomy trials and members (district) Agri-productivity Data
Farmer cooperative Geographic coverage of patrons; proximate supply chain members Grain storage and marketing Price
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the majority of its trials and members were located. Although the
participants from GW saw the local shires as their community
because GW had originated in a Landcare group, they had actually
accepted members from outside the community area and were
discussing extending GW to a bigger area, on the basis that their
trials provided useful information to farmers in areas with similar
rainfall and soil types. Interviewees from CV saw the supply chain
area of the cooperative as the community. And, for CW, community
also referred to the geographic area where the majority of its grain
was delivered from and where all its members resided.
Although on face value their deﬁnitions of ‘community’ differed,
one commonality was that they all referred to the area within the
service radius of the farmer organizations. From the selected cases,
we can see that various factors inﬂuence the service radius of
farmer organizations. The service radius of Landcare groups was
highly inﬂuenced by government policy,4 whereas the radius was
mainly decided by typical services provided in grower groups and
farmer cooperatives. However, ‘community’ always referred to the
geographic area and the residents within it that the farmer orga-
nization could reach.4.2. Three mechanisms regulating stakeholder interactions:
paperwork, data and price
Three distinctive patterns of regulatory mechanisms were
evident from the experiences of members and ofﬁcials from each of
the three types of groups: ‘paperwork’, ’data’ and ‘price’.
The primary mechanism described by locals in Landcare groups
was ‘paperwork’, as indicated in the following quotation of a LV
board member:
‘I can make an application and ﬁll it here in the kitchen at the
beginning. Very simple, because I'm a simple person, and I can
get some funding. But now to get some funding, we have to get
someone like Mike (ﬁctitious name, referred to the facilitator)
that can ﬁll all the dots and crosses… Paperwork is very difﬁcult
for local farmers. And you got sick of ﬁlling in these forms. And
90% of the farmers were the same…You have to apply for big lot
of money now. I could get $500 or $1000 (at the beginning), but
that's impossible now. You got to get $10,000 projects … If we
didn't have Mike here, Landcare in this area would die.’
The emergence of Landcare groups on national level in Australia
can be attributed to Australian governments at all levels.5 Accord-
ing to the initiators of LV and LW, they started their local Landcare
groups because the State and Federal Government wanted to invest
in conservation on farm land through the community and thus4 According to interviewees who have been involved in Landcare groups since
the beginning of the Landcare program in Australia, the Landcare groups were
supposed to operate within the physical boundaries of local shires with the help of
each shire council.
5 The Landcare movement originally derived from collaboration between the
Victorian Government and Victorian Farmer Federation. The Federal Government
subsequently decided to expand it into a national programme.there was money local farmers could easily access. That is why the
participant quoted above stated he could do paperwork in the
kitchen and obtain funding easily at the beginning of Landcare
programme. Yet the participant found that the paperwork burden
in applying for funds dramatically increased and became very
difﬁcult for the majority of farmers to handle after government
changed their policy in favour of big projects.6 Facilitators, who
were not usually local farmers and were employed for their
administrative skills, became the key to the survival of local
Landcare groups because of the burdens imposed under an
increasingly administratively driven process. Accordingly, paper-
work became the highest priority issue in Landcare groups in order
to keep them running.
To obtain funding from government agencies, local Landcare
groups must ﬁnd assistance as the farmer members were almost all
volunteers and paperwork was time consuming. Different Landcare
groups use different methods to ﬁnd the administratively skilled
person according to our interviews with staff in CMA in Victoria
and NACC in Western Australia. A few Landcare groups had local
farmer facilitators, and these were usually board members in the
group, to apply for funding. However, these groups faced the
problem of succession as the older people lost enthusiasm after
many years of work and the younger generation had not shown
interest in Landcare issues. Some Landcare groups formed a Land-
care network to employ one facilitator, whereas others turned to
facilitators working for the CMA or NACC to get help. In our case
study, LV was involved in a network formed by 17 Landcare groups
while LW was a combination of two Landcare groups that had
managed to employ their own facilitator through the combined
Landcare group.
In summary, paperwork was the key activity to obtain funding
from the government agencies, and some enthusiastic local farmers
sourced an administratively skilled person to help them with it
through Landcare groups as it was hard for individual farmers to
meet this administrative requirement. As a result, the need to
demonstrate administrative competence had materially and polti-
cally reshaped the networks and relationships between local
Landcare groups.
Although paperwork was also important work for staff mem-
bers in grower groups, it was not primary mechanism that regu-
lated the interaction of different stakeholder types. Instead, ‘data’
was emphasized by all stakeholder types in grower groups.
“Without data, you are only just another person with opinion.”
The above was the ﬁrst sentence of a researcher's presentation
at the Crop Update of GW. The key word ‘data’ explained the nature6 Over the last decades, Landcare programmes experienced several changes. First,
government gave funds directly to Landcare groups through National Landcare
Programme and related programmes. Then following the programme changes in
around 2002 and then 2008, regional or catchment level projects and activities
were emphasized to improve the strategic outcomes of Landcare (see Tennent and
Lockie, 2013). In response to concerns from Landcare groups about the adminis-
trative burden, government made money available directly to groups again but only
for relatively small grants. Despite this, the paperwork burden hasn't really changed
and is still high.
7 This trend was also demonstrated by studies on Australia Landcare programmes
over the last twenty years (see Tennent and Lockie, 2013).
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groups sought GRDC projects as a major source of funds that
enabled them to carry out locally relevant research for the beneﬁt
of their members while GRDC saw farmer groups as effective in
customising and communicating science and technology based
innovations, normally exhibited in the form of delivering on-farm
trial data to farmer members. According to participants from GV,
GW and GRDC, grower groups needed to demonstrate in the ap-
plications for projects and project contracts that they would pro-
vide objective data to farmers. For farmers, the main aim of
involvement in grower groups was getting access to scientiﬁc data
from on-farm trials conducted by the grower groups. When asked
the major beneﬁts as members, their replies were all similar to the
quotation below:
‘They run trials. You get all the trial result … They had about
three or four viewing of the trials throughout the year. So you
get to go to them to see what progress has been made or
different chemicals. It's just a way to get exposure to new
products really, and new ideas and testing different things. ’
Researchers employed by research organizations and commer-
cial companies also joined in the process of data production
together with farmer groups. Research organizations usually played
the role of collaborating with grower groups in funding applica-
tions whereas commercial companies were normally sponsors for
grower groups. Both these public and private researchers tried to
demonstrate the value of their research data via presentations to
farmers through grower groups. As one researcher from a research
organization stated:
‘It's important to show that your research will be put on the
ground if you want to apply for money from GRDC… If you do
not present your data to farmers, only you yourself know your
research.’
It can be seen from the analysis above that data was the
mechanism that served to coordinate interactions between the
stakeholders in the grower groups. In the process of data produc-
tion, GRDC was the investor, research organization and grower
groups were suppliers, farmers were both investors and consumers,
and commercial agri-business companies were a combination of
investor, suppliers and consumers. The work conducted in grower
groups was primarily about producing andmarketing data, through
which all stakeholders interacted with each other, received beneﬁt
and ensured legitimacy.
Although the incentive to belong to farmer cooperatives also
concerned increasing proﬁtability, proﬁtability was realized
through the mechanism of ‘price’, rather than data.
“Their (farmer cooperatives') business is to get the grain as
cheaply as they can. My business is to sell it as dear as I can. The
seller always wants the higher price and the buyer always want
the lower price. ”
The quotation above came from a farmer member of CW, who
has been involved in CW for more than 20 years. He stated that
the only reason he sold his grain through CW was that CW pro-
vided the best price on the day he prepared to sell his grain. It was
the price rather than membership that was decisive. The same
followed in CV although it was a much smaller cooperative than
CW. CV was established because of local farmers’ dissatisfaction
with the inefﬁciency of a big grain handling company (H), which
was the only bulk handler in that area before CV. Nonetheless,
almost all growers in the area still stored and sold some of theirgrain through H because it provided good prices for certain kinds
of grain.
When asked about the challenges in the organization, both
board members and managers in CV and CW replied that the
biggest challenge was the increasing competition in their business.
They said that the most important priority was to ensure they
offered services at a competitive price to guarantee attracting
enough grain to keep the business running. Some project funding
was available from government agencies for cooperatives, if they
could meet certain criteria, on the basis that the cooperatives were
community based and contributed to the proﬁtability of local
farmers. In contrast to Landcare and grower groups, the main in-
come of farmer cooperatives was derived from grain storage and
marketing. In summary, farmer cooperatives managed to survive
because: they offered competitive prices to local growers; gov-
ernment showed their support to farmer cooperatives for this
reason although fundingwasmodest and application for it difﬁcult;
and local growers became involved in farmer cooperatives due to
the good price they provided.
As described above, the three mechanisms of ‘paperwork’, ‘data’
and ‘price’, were the techniques that functioned to coordinate the
action of different stakeholders in the three types of farmer orga-
nizations. We now turn to examine the reactions to policy change
according to stakeholder types united under these mechanisms as
part of the process of ‘governing through the community’.
4.3. Different reactions to policy change within ‘the community’
When Landcare groups tended to become more project driven
because of policy change in Landcare programmes, administratively
skilled facilitators who undertook the essential work of applying for
and running government projects performed the key role for the
groups’ survival or success. Groups like LV and LW who gained the
help of facilitators managed to get involved in rural environmental
projects. Other Landcare groups who could not deal successfully
with the paperwork burden ceased functioning. According to our
interviews with participants involved in Landcare groups, the last
two decades has seen an obvious decline in the number of Landcare
groups.7 All participants spoke of the difﬁculties of convincing
more farmers, especially young farmers to become involved even in
active groups like LV and LW, because the survival of the Landcare
groups and the projects they implemented were not regarded as
providing farmers with the economic beneﬁts essential for the
survival of individual family farm. In short, paperwork was of the
highest importance for the survival of Landcare groups, but was not
perceived as rewarding work for the majority of farmers. Thus,
projects in Landcare groups were mainly a game played by gov-
ernment agencies, facilitators and small number of enthusiastic
farmers who usually occupied the role of Landcare group board
members.
Turning to grower groups, according to participants fromgrower
groups and GRDC, the latter changed its strategy in favour of big
projects that could cover a larger area and beneﬁt more growers.
Consequently, it was very important for grower groups applying for
projects to demonstrate that they could reduce project costs while
expanding their trials' geographic coverage by cooperating with
research organizations and commercial sponsors. Meanwhile,
public project funding relies highly on the government's policy di-
rection, which is not seen as stable because of changes of govern-
ment. This fact added to the burden of diversifying their income
sources to reduce the risk of relying on project funding in grower
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essential component of grower groups, membership fees formed
only a small proportion of the total income of the organizations
compared with money from projects and sponsors. Furthermore,
public project grants were highly controlled by government
agencies, whereas funding from sponsors could be used more
ﬂexibly to develop the organization from different aspects and thus
were more attractive to grower groups. It was difﬁcult for grower
groups to balance the various interests of stakeholder types in the
data production process given this background. Trials were con-
ducted to retain the main income sources, project grants and
funding from sponsors, andwere not necessarily related to the need
of farmer members. While grower groups sought to diversify their
income sources and produce data for different stakeholders, general
farmer members lost interest in being involved in the groups to
some extent. In one project meeting, participants from government
agencies, research organizations and commercial companies all
talked about the difﬁculties of getting farmers to attend the events
held by grower groups. As stated:
‘It's hard to get farmers to turn up to crop updates. Beer and
barbecue does not work anymore.’
The deregulation of the grain industry in recent decades8 was
seen as a big challenge for bulk handling farmer cooperatives,
especially those large cooperatives who had enjoyed a monopoly
on grain handling in certain geographic areas before deregulation.
To survive the increasingly serious competition, some farmer co-
operatives were privatized while others kept operating as co-
operatives but tried hard to improve their services and to diversify
their income sources. Both managers from CV and CW spoke of
their struggle in the new environment as cooperatives, and the
problems derived from privatizing cooperatives to become com-
mercial companies. However, for general farmer members, dereg-
ulation policy was not necessarily something to worry about.
Rather, they saw it as an opportunity to chase higher grain prices in
the market. Just as one farmer member from CW stated:
‘There are also other buyers for noodle wheat (except CW),
which is good. You need three or four buyers, then you have
competition. If you only get one buyer…, see the price of lupins
is really terrible, because there's only one or two buyers. There's
no competition in lupins and we get stitched up on price all the
time because CW is the only one that buy it.’
For farmers, it was the price rather than the buyer that mattered
most. This is totally understandable as historically cooperatives
were established by farmers as a way to achieve higher prices. That
is, it has always been about price for growers and the ways to
achieve this is a means to an end.
Faced with the different interests of farmer organizations and
their members, government agencies had or had tried in their
policy design to strengthen the connection between these two
kinds of stakeholders as is discussed in the following section.4.4. Reaction of government agencies to the differences within ‘the
community’
As the work in Landcare groups became more administratively8 The deregulation policy of wheat marketing started from late the 1980s in
Australia. The 1990s started to see the inﬂuence of this policy. Yet, various states
and grain markets were affected at different time (see Pritchard, 1998; Kingwell and
Pannell, 2005).demanding and project driven, growers gradually lost interest
because they did not see it as closely related to their on-farm
proﬁtability. In response, government agencies tried to (re)con-
nect the environmental projects with productivity issues in their
programme design. To obtain government projects funds, Landcare
groups are now required to show a close relationship between their
proposed project and economic beneﬁts to growers. For example
the environmental project from NACC in LW concerned ‘Improving
productivity on non-wetting soils in the Northern Agricultural
Region (NAR) through Pasture Cropping’. And the projects in LV
emphasized weed control on farm. We can see this attempt to
reconcile environmental with production aims from the following
statement of a Landcare facilitator in LW who afforded a clear
articulation of this change of emphasis within environmental
projects:
‘ … at the moment there's not much more just for Landcare,
so there's no “you just planting trees”, that's gone, the funding
is gone. So instead of pure Landcare, you try to have sus-
tainable agriculture. And that comes into Landcare as well.
One of my new projects is trying a new salt bush species. So
we have got funding for that. So we can put it in some mar-
ginal land, then you can graze your sheep on it. It restores
your soil, so it's Landcare. But at the same time, because you
can graze it, it's agriculture … There's no money on purely
Landcare anymore.’
For grower groups, the membership fee formed only a small
proportion of income compared to funds from public projects and
commercial sponsors. Yet, it was actually a much more important
component than it appeared. When asked what the key factors
were for successful funding applications, staff members in GV and
GW all stated that the number of farmer members was very
important and you would gain advantage in the competition for
funding with a larger number of members, or in other words, more
growers that the project would potentially beneﬁt compared to
other groups. So the importance of membership fees in grower
groups should not only be weighed by its proportional contribution
to total income. This made grower groups pay more attention to
their connection with growers’ needs, although balancing the re-
quirements of their stakeholders remained difﬁcult. When asked
about challenges facing the grower groups, these interviewees all
stated that the most important thing for the group was to maintain
relations with growers.
As farmer cooperatives, CV and CW did not receive any
project funding from government agencies, but enjoyed a tax
exemption and all of these interviewees mentioned that they
would lose this tax advantage if they were privatized. Deregu-
lation policy brought more competitors for CV and CW and
caused some farmer cooperatives to change into normal com-
mercial companies. However, the tax advantage and mainte-
nance of farmer control were important factors to be taken into
account while considering privatization. As one CW board
member stated, when he fought against the privatization of CW
in the year 2000:
‘… I asked them to show me the beneﬁts for farmers (if CW got
privatized). And if it was better for farmers, I would totally
support it. But they couldn't offset the loss of the tax exemption
that we have. They couldn't guarantee that the price (of grain
storage) wouldn't go up. There was no guarantee that we would
keep control of it. And as times go on and on, companies that
privatized, they've totally lost control. There were a few farmers
that still got shares in it, but not to the extent they got any
control at all.’
9 according to the International Co-operative Alliance and Co-operatives National
Law in Australia (Part 1.3 of the ‘Co-operative (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012
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terests in the community could be solved through policy design.
However, the concept of ‘targeted customer’ raised in the
following section points to conﬂicts that are harder to address in
this way.
4.5. Targeted customer versus ‘the community’
‘Oftenwe don't segment and understand the audience who is in
the market for the piece of research we are doing… In our state,
we've got this 5000 farmers, only 2000 of those are really
sizable scale. How we communicate and engage with those
2000? Often, there's only 500 of them in the market for some of
the research we are doing. We should be focusing [on this 500]
rather than… mass communication.’
The above quotation was the reply the CEO of a grower group
gave when asked about the relationship between growers and the
group. He pointed out that the targeted customer, rather than all
the growers in the community, should be regarded as the audience
for their research. ‘Targeted customer’ was the concept that
divided the community into two parts: one part was growers
connected to the farmer organization, the other part was those
who were not related to it. Connection between growers and
farmer organizations could be decided by economic factors, i.e.
growers had to be sufﬁciently proﬁtable to be a member. For
example, growers had to continue investing in certain software to
be involved in a project in GV; and had to deliver no less than 600
tonnes over the past three seasons to CW to retain their mem-
bership. Other factors could inﬂuence growers' participation in
farmer organizations as well. For example, one interviewee from
LV stated that he initiated a Landcare group mainly because of his
own philosophy of the relationship between human society and
nature, and some other farmers just had different philosophies
and never cared about the environment so they tended not to
involve in Landcare.
We now turn to discuss the role of farmer organizations in the
process of ‘governing through the community’, the tensions
generated due to different interests during the interactions focused
on the three regulating mechanisms, the effects of government
policies and the conﬂicts that are hard to address with policy
design.
5. Discussion: a dialectic of distance, tensions and legitimacy
5.1. Governing through representatives of the community
While the concept of community has been well problematized
within the literature (eg. Harrington et al., 2008; Scott and Hogg,
2015; Prager et al., 2015) the analysis above articulates how this
concept was used ﬂexibly by different farmer organizations to
make certain areas, and residents within those areas, repre-
sentable. Despite the various framings of ‘community’ offered by
the interviewees, the shared commonalities relating to the area
of, and residents within, the service radius of the farmer orga-
nizations. In other words, for farmer organizations, ‘community’
always referred to the area and residents they can claim to
represent. For Landcare and grower groups whose main income
sources are public funding, emphasizing their role as represen-
tatives of the community is an important way to strengthen their
legitimacy in applying for and running public projects, which are
intended to be designed for the interests of the rural community.
For farmer cooperatives, one principle that must be obeyed is‘concern for community’.9 Although ‘price’ is the main mecha-
nism governing interaction between farmer members and farmer
cooperatives, the members do contribute to the establishment of
farmer cooperatives especially at the beginning. The ethic of
working on behalf of the community makes the cooperatives
somewhat more attractive for farmers than normal commercial
companies.
In their devolution of responsibility to communities (Rose,
1996b; Lockie, 1999; Herbert-Cheshire, 2000; Everingham, 2001;
Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins, 2004), government agencies need to
ﬁnd representative intermediaries who can both embody the
concept of ‘community’ and implement government policies by
conducting assemblages of projects. Participants from government
agencies also discussed the relationship between different gov-
ernment agencies. As they usually possess the power to distribute
public funding speciﬁcally in certain ﬁelds, different government
agencies have to ﬁnd representatives of ‘the community’, who are
adept at the speciﬁc functions or knowledgeable of the issues they
prioritise within their agencies. For example, funding for Landcare
groups usually comes from the Department of Environment and
CMAs, and projects for grower groups normally related to GRDC
and Departments of Agriculture. For government agencies, it is not
the exact meaning of ‘the community’ that matters; rather, they are
more interested in who can act as representatives of the commu-
nity on certain issues so that they can make their policy workable.5.2. Tensions in governing through representatives of the
community
Asmentioned before, the three types of farmer organizations we
studied were positioned at different distances from the ‘state’. We
can see the differences from both the proportions of project fund-
ing in their income sources and in the primary mechanisms that
regulate their interactions.
Landcare groups are the closest to government agencies out of
the three farmer group types because their survival depends almost
completely on project funding. Thus Landcare groups are subject to
the highest degree of government control, which is exercised in the
form of paperwork. Paperwork is not merely a way to implement
agri-environmental projects or policies, it is actually “an authori-
tative tune” (Scott, 1998), to which Landcare groups must dance in
order to survive. However, it is not necessarily a tune that general
members in the community must dance to, for their survival ulti-
mately relies upon the income from their own farm to which the
projects are not seen as closely related. Landcare groups have to
reinterpret the community need to make it match the priorities of
government agencies to increase the probability of success in
winning funding. As the work in Landcare groups becomes more
administratively orientated and thus professionalized, Landcare
groups risk becoming increasingly distanced from their
community.
The mechanism of ‘data’ in grower groups as one form of
‘knowledge’ becomes an important instrument of ‘governing
through self-governance’, and the corresponding power of experts,
is well recognized (Rose, 1993; Reed, 1996; Lemke, 2002; Carolan,
2006). However, we can see from our study that knowledge
(data) is not merely an instrument of governing for government
agencies, it is also a marketing method used by commercial com-
panies whose targeted consumers are growers. Grower groups, to
reduce their risk of relying on funding from government agencies,No 29’).
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panies as well through product trials. Although, knowledge con-
ﬂicts are not necessarily induced from the production of data for
different funding bodies, some of the trials conducted by grower
groups look more outsider-driven than farmer-driven from the
perspective of general member growers. This sees growers
becoming more reluctant to join in the data-sharing events in
grower groups. The power of all the ‘knowledge’ produced in
grower groups is actually weakened by the felt loss of ownership of
the work carried out by their group. In this way the currency of
‘data’ can become self-defeating to the groups claims of legiti-
mately representing local framer interests.
Farmer cooperatives are the least directly connected to gov-
ernment agencies out of these three kinds of farmer organizations.
They are also the typemost directly connected to economic beneﬁts
for growers compared to Landcare groups and grower groups.
Instead of repeatedly announcing their representativeness of the
community to government agencies to apply for funds, they
emphasize their close relationship with their community andmake
themselves more attractive to growers by ‘employing locally,
spending locally and supporting local schools and clubs’. Yet, the
‘cost-price squeeze’, in which farmers face worsening terms of
trade with their costs going up faster than the price they receive for
their produce, makes ‘price’ the most important thing for growers
to think about while making decisions. Deregulation policy, which
has increased the competition among grain bulk handling bodies, is
seen as a signiﬁcant challenge by farmer cooperatives. But dereg-
ulation is embraced as a good policy for farmers as long as it
functions to increase grain prices. The survival of farmer co-
operatives relies upon the productivity and loyalty of growers,
whereas, the survival of growers does not necessarily rely upon the
operating of farmer cooperatives.
5.3. Strengthening legitimacy of representatives
Through processes of policy design and implementation we see
in our study government agencies making compensatory arrange-
ments to enhance the connection between representatives of the
community and those who are represented. This strategy, termed
‘hybrid governance’ (Higgins and Lockie, 2002; Lockie and Higgins,
2007), try to attract locals by (re)connecting government projects
with farmers' productivity issues. While there are conﬂicts be-
tween different mentalities within this governance regime (Lockie
&Higgins, 2007; Lockwood and Davidson, 2010), we can see in our
study that this hybrid governance strategy actually strengthen
legitimacy of farmer organizations as representatives of the com-
munity to some extent and, in doing so this make these groups
something that can be governed through, and members of the
community reachable to ‘the state’.
However, use of the concept ‘targeted customer’ indicates a
more complex relationship between farmer organizations and
other growers in the community more broadly. Growers decided to
participate in the farmer organization or not according to various
factors. Farmer organizations announced their aim as encouraging
the social and economic ﬂourishing of ‘the community’. Yet, ‘the
community’ that they could claim to represent were only the tar-
geted customers rather than the whole community. Thus the
community that could be reached through farmer organizations
were only the part formed by the ‘targeted customers’.
6. Conclusion
This study explored the manner of ‘governing through com-
munity’ in rural Australia. To understand and explain this phe-
nomenon we focused on three mechanisms of regulation that hadboth discursive and material forms. These mechanisms of paper-
work, data and price are structure and legitimize interaction be-
tween governments, rural communities and their representative
organizations. This analytic strategy proved useful in bridging
different perspectives in the governmentality literature which
describe ‘governing through the community’ from top-down, bot-
tom-up, and hybrid perspectives.
We found that government agencies have to cooperate with
representatives of the community in order to embody the concept
‘the community’ and make a community governable, no matter
what the exact deﬁnition of community being relied upon, or the
distance between the state and farmer organization created by the
extent of ﬁnancial dependence.
Landcare groups are the closest and most tractable to the state.
The mechanism of ‘paperwork’, betrays the administratively
demanding nature of their work and status as almost totally
inﬂuenced by the priorities of government agencies. The behaviour
of grower groups is highly inﬂuenced by government polices as
well, although this inﬂuence is not as strong as is upon Landcare
groups. The mechanism of ‘data’ governs interaction between
government agencies, grower groups and general farmer members.
While grower groups diversify their income sources to survive, the
power of data as knowledge is weakened as data production be-
comes more outsider than farmer driven from growers' perspec-
tives. Farmer cooperatives are the least directly related to the state
and are not strongly inﬂuenced by government agencies compared
with Landcare or grower groups whose main income rely on public
funding of projects. ‘Price’ is the main interaction mechanism be-
tween farmer cooperative and general farmer members. This kind
of farmer organization is also supported by government to some
extent as they enhance economic beneﬁts to growers and
contribute to the development of the community. However, the
dominance of ‘price’ also shows us the tensions between the in-
terests of farmer cooperative as an organization and growers as
individual entrepreneurs.
Government agencies have developed strategies in their policies
to deal with these tensions in the process of governing through
representatives of the community. These arrangements are
designed to strengthen the legitimacy of representatives and bring
the broader community within reach. Yet, in practice only sections
of the community that formed by targeted customers of the farmer
organization were potentially reachable.
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